Erlinger v. United States presents another Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) case, but with a Fifth and Sixth Amendment angle. The dispute centers on whether a judge, rather than a jury, can determine whether three offenses were committed on separate occasions.
Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion holding that the jury must make these findings. He was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan and Barrett. Justice Gorsuch’s poetic praise for jury shows he, too, has the majority Jacques, which would include a broad interpretation of the Seventh Amendment. This prediction is worth the price you pay.
Judge Jackson wrote a separate dissent. she thinks study was wrongly decided.
I disagree for several reasons, including that I think Apprendi’s decision was wrong. Like many jurists and other observers before me, I do not believe that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority when it authorized judges to make factual determinations relevant to punishment and to direct specific sentencing outcomes based on those findings.
I don’t have that on my bingo card. Jackson declined to further extend this precedent. I propose this strategy for originalist judges—even if certain precedents qualify as stare decisis factors, there is no obligation to extend them to new circumstances. Jackson wrote:
Of course I admit it study is a binding precedent for this Court and one that “has now defined the relevant legal regime” for nearly a quarter of a century. alley v. USA, 570 US 99, 122 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Considering reality, untie this knot study In the course of our courts’ jurisprudence, juxtaposition may not be feasible at this time. But considering its inherent shortcomings studyway, I can’t attend today’s strive to further extend studyheldespecially when there are established recidivism exceptions study The rules applicable to the circumstances of the case before us.
Justice Jackson, a long-time district court judge, appeared to have lost some faith in the ability of juries to decide complex issues. She will restore that power to the bench. She explained:
I am writing this separately to provide an additional critical perspective study Doctrine – one is Understand the practical effects of sentencingbefore and after study-And pay attention to the application study ACCA’s case discovery rules create all sorts of practical problems that could easily be avoided by simply allowing judges to do what they have always done.
Judge Gorsuch seemed troubled by Jackson’s lack of confidence in the jury.
But the Constitution does not take such a pessimistic view of juror competence or the rigor of trials. Of course, a jury is no less capable than a judge in deciding whether three past events occurred on three separate occasions. . . . 27. Judge Jackson may view juries as a “barrier” to harsher punishments. but”[t]The bottom line is this: the people ratified the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, not any of our personal opinions.
I worked in federal district court for two years and then in circuit court for a year. I have sat in on dozens of sentencing proceedings and several criminal jury trials. When I started serving as circuit clerk, I implored my colleagues to actually attend the sentencing proceedings and see what it was like. How can you meaningfully review a sentencing hearing transcript without actually seeing the sentencing hearing transcript? There is a magistrate’s court opposite the hall. This takes little effort. As far as I can remember, they never did. I suspect most appellate judges and most appellate judges have never even seen a sentencing proceeding or a jury trial. Judge Jackson’s opinion matters, whether she is wrong or not study.
Also not on my bingo card is Judge Jackson’s favorite quote from Jonathan Mitchell, who is also called a “genius” in these parts. study.
Justice Kavanaugh wrote the lead dissent, joined by Justice Alito. Perhaps to no one’s surprise, his analysis turned on Tradition!
In the absence of any “unifying” “tradition,” the Court concluded that the choice between these approaches was left to the legislature and not subject to “federal constitutional guarantees.” Ibid., pp. 246-247. Held that “the Constitution’s requirement to treat recidivism as an ‘element’ of the applicant’s crime would mark an abrupt departure from the Constitution” A long tradition” A judge or jury may determine that the defendant is a repeat offender. Ibid., p. 244.
The concept of tradition recurs throughout the opinion:
Changes in early US practice preclude the argument that the right to apply recidivism enhancements to juries was traditionally understood As an inherent part of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
There is one in the United States long tradition Legislative discretion regarding whether a judge or jury applies a recidivist sentencing enhancement.
this unique tradition Traditionally, provisions for enhanced penalties for repeat offenses of past offenses have coexisted with the general right to a jury trial for current offenses.
Justice Gorsuch responded that no such actual tradition existed:
In summary, amicus evidence may indicate that in a limited number of jurisdictions, judges can find the existence, number, and dates of a defendant’s prior convictions. the basis of strength. Not to mention proving “‘A long tradition'” In this country, judges are allowed to discover any fact about a defendant’s “recidivism”[m]” Post, page 5 (comments of KAVANAUGH, J.).
Justice Kavanaugh also responded to Justice Thomas’ concurrence, explaining why Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998) should not be overruled. I see no other reason for such a lengthy analysis other than to show his vote Ramos and Dobbs The doctrine of stare decisis generally applies to new situations. I suspect Alito had to hold his nose at the bit about “tradition.” Decide factor”.
Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts agreed with Justice Kavanaugh that the error in this case was probably harmless, so Mr. Erlinger might not see any actual relief. Instead, he will be stuck in what Judge Kavanaugh called a “pointless remand.”
