Some federal criminal statutes require the criminal intent to be “corrupt.” What does “corruption” mean? In two cases this term, the Supreme Court has shied away from clearly defining that mentality.
28 USC § 1512(c)(2), the statute at issue Fisher v. United States,supply:
(c) Any person who corrupts—
or
(2) otherwise obstruct, influence or impede any official proceeding, or attempt to do so,
shall be punished under this title with a fine or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years, or with both.
most Fisher The question is whether the word “otherwise” limits the offense in (c)(2) to the type of offense in (c)(1). Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion held that (c)(1) does limit (c)(2), which is not a “catch-all” provision for all other obstruction of justice crimes. Judge Barrett’s dissent rejected this interpretation. Justice Jackson was perhaps the surprise vote as she joined the majority. However, Jackson wrote a separate consent document that distanced itself from the alleged statutory intent and attempted to determine legislative intent.
Who got it right? use Loper Bright As a model, what is the “best” interpretation of the statute? We know that there can only be one “best” interpretation of a statute. This case is difficult. In the court below, I was persuaded by Justice Casas’s dissent, which Chief Justice Roberts relied on repeatedly. Nonetheless, I find parts of Judge Barrett’s analysis compelling. For all my criticisms of Barrett’s background as a law professor—and others have made similar points—she excels on issues of statutory interpretation. This is a case that occurs in all cases of statutory interpretation. Barrett’s discussion of hypothetical regulations and responses to the Chiefs zoo and football analogies were sharp. Overall, I think this is a golden opportunity. I can hear Judge Gorsuch yelling “Leniency” in the back of my head, so I’ll probably rule for the defendant here. But my interest here focuses on the mens rea of the statute, which does not directly inform the court’s decision.
Section 1512(c) applies only to a person who performs prescribed conduct “in a corrupt manner.” What does corruption mean? judges real Don’t want to tell us.
Chief Justice Roberts explained that the government did not provide a specific definition of corruption in the statute:
But the government acknowledged that “Congress did not define ‘corruption’ under Section 1512.” Ibid., p. 44. (quoting Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 US 696, 705 (2005)), it never convincingly explained how “knowingly that we[ing] intimidation” or “threat”[s]“It is not ‘wrong’ to target someone. §1512(b).
It is difficult to define “corruption” simply as “error.” If so, the word “corruption” would have no meaning. All actions listed in 1512 (alteration, destruction, obstruction, etc.) are wrong. The mens rea element must describe the defendant’s state of mind at the time he committed the acts. The word “immoral” depends on a certain moral concept. Can the government still prohibit unethical behavior? United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges? The Court clearly held that “moral objection” was not a rational basis for state action. I don’t think the government can criminalize an act just because the government deems it “immoral.”
We are left with “fall” or “evil”. I’m not sure these two words express “corruption” in its colloquial use. One can do evil without participating in corruption. Even supervillains can act honestly and openly. A person can be corrupt without being evil. Charities can provide important public services by bribing government officials to obtain grants. “Corruption” and “evil” seem to be different concepts.
In the court below, Chief Justice Robert quoted Justice Walker’s definition of “corruption”:
Judge Walker agreed in part with the sentence because he interpreted the statute’s mens rea element as “corruption,” requiring the defendant to act in a manner “with intent to obtain an unlawful advantage.” Ibid., page 361 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This feeling of “corruption” involves a certain self-enrichment. Imagine a government official accepting a briefcase full of cash in exchange for taking official action. A person who accepts a bribe – explicit something for something——It is very likely that there is a “corrupt” mentality.
Most relied on the uncertainty about “corruption” to suggest that the government’s interpretation of the statute was broad. Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that Section 1512(c)(2) could be used to subject “activists and lobbyists to decades in prison.” The deputy attorney general acknowledged that “under the government’s interpretation, peaceful protesters can be charged under Section 1512(c)(2) and face 20 years in prison if they act “corruptly.” If “corruption” simply meant “wrong,” it would not be difficult to bring such an indictment.
Judge Barrett dissented, holding that “‘corrupt’ elements should screen out innocent activists and lobbyists engaged in legitimate activities.” Perhaps this argument fits Judge Walker’s definition, but D.C. Circuit precedent holds that “corrupt ” means “using illegal means” or “acting for an illegal purpose.” in other words, Incorrect. Why are protesters excluded from such a broad definition? Barrett had no explanation.
Judge Barrett also wrote that “a defendant may challenge the applicable First Amendment.” Oh really? Just a week ago, Justice Barrett joined Chief Justice Roberts in the majority opinion Laxmi, which rejects anything in the Second Amendment that applies. I wrote an article about this issue here. I have since learned that the law in this area is very unclear. In short, it appears that in a motion to dismiss a criminal prosecution, a defendant who argues that a statute is unconstitutional under the First or Second Amendment can only Present a face challenge. (The criteria appear to be different for challenges based on the principle of enumerated powers, e.g. Lopez.) result, Salerno standards apply, the defendant must prove that the statute is unconstitutional all greeting. Broad doctrine may come into play—if such a doctrine still exists—but the applicable challenge is not permitted in a motion to dismiss the indictment. If Judge Barrett now believes that a First Amendment challenge applies, she can revisit Laxmi.
This semester, the courts have also discussed bribery and “corruption” Snyder v. United States. This case touches on the line between bribery and gratuity. Judge Jackson dissented, writing that the meaning of “corruption” was immaterial in this case.
Likewise, the precise meaning of the word “corruption” is not the problem we face today. Nor does it matter here, because whatever “corruption” means, Snyder’s actions clearly fit the bill, making this case inappropriate for exploring the contours of that term.
Jackson also cited Arthur Anderson The case concluded that corruption was linked to a “consciousness of wrongdoing”. This seems similar to “knowledge” of mens rea or something similar. In other words, “Prosecutors must not only prove that a state, local or tribal official acted inappropriately when accepting gifts or payments, but they must also prove that she Know “It is wrong to accept gifts or payments.” Isn’t “corruption” any different from “knowing” that what you are doing is wrong or illegal? A sense of evil? Fisher The consensus doesn’t even attempt to define “corruption.”
exist SnyderJustice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion attempted to shed some light on the term:
Federal and state law distinguish between two types of payments to public officials: bribes and gratuities. Generally speaking, a bribe is a payment or agreement made in advance of an official act to influence an official’s future official action. U.S. law generally treats bribery as inherently corrupt and illegal. . . .
As these examples illustrate, a gratuity following a formal act is not the same as a bribe preceding a formal act. After all, unlike gratuities, bribes corrode official behavior—meaning that officials act in private gain rather than in the public interest.
Bribery is “corrupt” because it’s not the order: it’s the payment forward official act; this GBP Before status quo. Bribery is the performance of certain official acts in exchange for certain personal benefits. Again, I would like to point out Justice Walker’s definition of “corruption” in the following proceedings: When a person “acts”[s] “With intent to obtain unlawful benefit for oneself or another.”
During Trump’s first impeachment, Seth Barrett Tillman and I explained It is important to distinguish the “personal” interests of government officials from the public interest of society. The two are often difficult to separate. However, when one government official performs a public act in exchange for another government official performing a public act, there is no bribery and their conduct is not “corrupt.” Instead, there was political compromise. Any attempt to criminalize these actions criminalizes politics.
