The Court held that this lawsuit arose out of a years-long investigation by the plaintiff, the New York State Attorney General’s Office (“OAG”) into certain business practices engaged in by the defendants since 2011. The individual and entity defendants committed repeated and persistent fraud by preparing, certifying, and submitting false and misleading financial statements to lenders and insurance companies, thereby violating New York State Administrative Law § 63(12).
In its decision and order dated September 26, 2023, this Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs only on liability and the first cause of action.
On February 16, 2024, following a three-month trial, this Court issued a verdict and order following a non-jury trial, finding the defendants liable on the remaining six causes of action. The court ordered certain injunctive relief, including the continuation of the judge’s injunction. Barbara Jones (Ret.) As an independent monitor for the Trump Organization, the court is obligated to maintain jurisdiction over the action even though the trial is over.
On May 8, 2024, NBC New York reported that Adam Leitman Bailey, an attorney unconnected with the case, boasted that weeks before I issued the decision and order following the nonjury trial, he “Seek assistance from the presiding judge.”
On July 11, 2024, this Court ordered the defendants, in part, to issue a subpoena to Bailey directing him to disclose any documents or communications in his possession involving, discussing, or in any way referring to the litigation.
The defendants now file a motion under New York Administrative Law 22 100.3(E)(1) asking that I recuse myself or that another judge hold an evidentiary hearing regarding these communications and their potential impact on the court’s decision.
Unsolicited one-sided communications
Sometime around February of this year, a few weeks before I issued my posttrial decision and order, at the end of my work day, I left the dressing room in the courthouse at 60 Center Street and took the elevator down to the main floor. There, on the outskirts of the famous Rotunda, Bailey struck up a conversation with me and began haranguing me about Section 63(12) of the Administrative Code. He did not relay any alleged facts.
{The irony, of course, is that the defendants whose position Bailey ostensibly advocates are moving for me to recuse themselves, while the plaintiffs whose position Bailey ostensibly advocates disputes are opposing the motion. This shows that the defendant was motivated not by moral considerations but by seeking an opportunity to reverse the trajectory and outcome of the case.
Until then, I considered Bailey a professional acquaintance and a distant friend. I was taken aback by his sudden appearance and intense words, and I just told him he was wrong. As I walked down the judge’s stairs to street level, he was still trailing behind me, continuing to buzz. I got in the car, didn’t say another word (except maybe “goodbye”), and left.
For some three and a half years before this unpleasant incident, starting in September 2020, I conducted an in-depth study of section 63(12) and issued a number of rulings based on it, including preliminary injunctions and Summary judgment decision. I certainly don’t need landlord-tenant lawyers ranting about this. I didn’t initiate, welcome, encourage, engage in, or learn from, much less enjoy, Bailey’s tirades. As Bailey bizarrely, falsely and defamatoryly claimed, I did not base any of my rulings on this. After three and a half years of research and immersion in Section 63(12), the entire 90-second incident was, in the vernacular, “nothing burger”. I might have forgotten all of this by now if Bailey hadn’t tried to bolster his reputation as someone who could influence judges (which would have been unethical and probably illegal, but Bailey still publicly boasted about it).
Because of the widespread news coverage of this trial, passers-by often recognized and confronted me on the street, at parties, in parks, in restaurants, and on public transportation. Sometimes their unsolicited words are complimentary. Sometimes they are derogatory. They will never influence my ruling. Like my forced encounter with Bailey, I felt no need to report these fleeting incidents.
The defendants claimed to rely on the rule that judges may consult experts only under certain conditions. I have not consulted Bailey and I certainly do not consider him an expert on Administrative Law section 63(12)….
Defendant’s defense
In support of their motion, the Defendants cite a series of op-eds and blogs (from Wall Street Journal op-eds, National Review, Newsmax, the New York Post, YouTube videos, and the Warlock Conspiracy) criticizing the Court’s legal decisions. Defendants collectively use as “evidence” that “this Court’s final decision certainly undermines public confidence in the integrity of New York’s legal system.” As this Court has detailed in its previous orders, denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial, “Editorial Opinion Those condemning the plaintiff’s case…are irrelevant and have no evidentiary value.
Furthermore, the cases cited by the defendants in support of recusal did not advance their claims.
The defendant claimed to rely on George’s business (NY 2013), in support of their claim that the conduct alleged here is “contrary to the role of a judge.” There, the judge presided over a case in which he had close personal, professional and financial relationships with a party but did not disclose that relationship. As with every case that the defendants recuse themselves from citing, the facts are completely different than those presented in this article.
The defendant also claimed to rely on Levin problem (NY 1989), a judge stayed proceedings in favor of one party and “by his conduct…conveyed in ex parte communications the impression that his decision was based not on merit but on his loyalty to the party” and loyalty”. [a] Former political leader.
The defendant also cited Ayers incident (NY 2017), the presiding judge repeatedly initiated ex parte dialogue in an attempt to influence the favorable disposition of his daughter’s traffic ticket. I did not initiate this encounter, I did not have a conversation, and neither I nor any of my family members have a personal interest in this case.
exist people v leicester (NY Just. Ct. 2002), the judge received ex parte communications from a party to the litigation at home.
exist Warnerhead Incident (NY 1988), judges often sought out and interviewed witnesses outside the courtroom and made rulings based on their unsworn communications.
defendant’s reliance Fuchsberg Affair (NY Jud. Ct. 1978), which was wrong because in that case the judge presided over a case in which he had an undisclosed financial interest and the judge had engaged in discussions with fellow law professors on at least 12 pending cases. Negotiate.
exist Murphy incident (NY 1993), judges are “careles[s] Dealing with public funds” deposited in court…
In summary, all defendants’ cases were clearly inconsistent, fundamentally inappropriate, or refused to recuse themselves.
Finally, the defendants emphasized their claim: “Based on public reports, it is now clear that this court is also under investigation by the Commission on Judicial Conduct.” However, I have not been contacted by the Commission and I am not aware of any such investigation. Unsubstantiated investigative allegations cannot require disqualification.
discuss
“Pursuant to Section 14 of the Judiciary Act, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of a challenge in the absence of lawful disqualification.”
Since there is no grounds for mandatory recusal here, it’s up to me and my conscience to decide whether this 90-second, unsolicited diatribe was made by a non-partisan person with whom I am completely familiar and fully immersed. carried out in law. I hereby state unequivocally that this is not the case.
The Advisory Council on Judicial Ethics states directly that a judge has no ethical obligation to disclose an attempted ex parte communication by a non-party who does not allege any relevant facts but merely expresses an opinion about how the matter should be handled view. Advisory opinions 98-144available at https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicopinions/98-144_.htm
also, “[n]o A judge may recuse himself based on alleged misconduct committed by others. R&R Capital LLC v Merritt (NY Sup. Ct. 2008) (noting that “[b]Because this Court has no prejudice against either party to this dispute but indicates who will be the prevailing party in our decision on the issue before us, there is no reason why a recusal should be granted”). Therefore, recusal based on Bailey’s sole conduct, which did not influence my decision, is unfounded.
and,
[W]Recusal should not be ordered if there is no reason for recusal, especially if it would lead to prejudice. indeed, “‘[a] A judge is obligated not to recuse himself or herself, even if prosecuted in connection with his or her duties, unless he or she is convinced that he or she is unable to discharge his or her duties with complete impartiality, either in fact or in appearance.
I have presided over this proceeding, and the special proceedings that preceded it, for more than three and a half years. There are a total of 2,624 individual entries in both files. I reviewed tens of thousands of documents in camera (and out), throughout extensive discovery, motion practice, and trials. Recusal now would bring huge prejudice to the parties, the public and the judicial process.
I am as confident in my ability to continue serving impartially as I have ever been.
seek alternative relief
As an alternative to recusal, the defendant requested an evidentiary hearing before a different judge of the court “as to the truth of Mr. Bailey’s allegations and the court and [the Office of Court Administration’s] deny. The rules would only empower Bailey, who has been accused of wrongdoing, to confront witnesses against him in an investigation into his alleged professional misconduct.
