from Spicuza v Commonwealthruled yesterday by the Massachusetts Superior Court:
The petition stems from an ongoing trial in the Commonwealth’s Norfolk County Superior Court and. Karen Reed. Reed was charged with murder and other crimes, and the case drew widespread public attention, including protests and demonstrations near the courthouse…
The trial court issued an order stating,
While this case is pending, no person may demonstrate in any manner, including carrying signs or placards, within 200 feet of the courthouse unless otherwise ordered by this court. The complex includes parking lots behind the Norfolk Superior Courthouse and Norfolk County Register of Deeds buildings. Individuals are also prohibited from using audio enhancement devices at protests….
The Massachusetts Superior Court upheld the order:
In establishing the buffer zone, the judge said she was seeking to balance First Amendment rights to free speech and the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The judge noted that during court proceedings, protesters yelled at witnesses, confronted victims’ families and “presented material that may or may not be used as evidence during the trial.” She also said witness intimidation has been a “common problem”. …
[T]There is no doubt that the order establishing a no-go area does impose some restrictions on the speech of the petitioners. However, as the petitioners themselves acknowledge, restrictions on speech are not necessarily problematic or unconstitutional in themselves. quite,
“States may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech and assembly, provided that the restrictions are reasonable without regard to the content of the protected speech and that the restrictions are specifically tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. , and they leave open adequate alternative channels for the exchange of information.
In this case, the 200-foot buffer meets the “reasonable limitation” requirement.
First, despite petitioners’ arguments to the contrary, the restrictions imposed by buffer zones are content-neutral. “In speech cases generally, and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, the primary issue in determining content neutrality is whether the government is imposing restrictions on speech because it disagrees with the message conveyed by the speech.” According to the petitioners, during the trial The fact that the protesters who showed up outside the courthouse all supported the defendants in the criminal trial had nothing to do with the creation of the buffer zone. Any protests against the defendants and in support of the Commonwealth will be similarly subject to the buffer zone. “Government regulation of expressive activity is content-neutral as long as it is ‘reasonable without regard to the content of the regulated speech.’” Additionally, and the petitioners’ argument that buffer zones are not content-neutral because commercial speech Still allowed, the fact that the restrictions imposed by the buffer zones “have collateral effects on some speakers or messages but not others” does not mean the buffer zones are unconstitutional.
Second, the 200-foot buffer limit was “designed solely to serve significant government interests.” The buffer zone, which is smaller than the 500-foot area required by the Commonwealth, will help ensure a fair trial — a vital government interest — by clearing the way for jurors, witnesses and others to enter and exit the courthouse. shall not be hindered or interfered with by protesters or demonstrators, nor shall they be subject to any accompanying intimidation or harassment. The buffer also helps protect jurors who, as the trial judge noted, must remain fair and impartial from outside influences arising from, for example, viewing pictures of putative evidence directly in their path.
The buffer zone does not prevent petitioners or anyone else from engaging in the same form of protest as before; it simply restricts them from doing so within a limited area associated with court property. In doing so, it leaves open “ample alternative channels for the exchange of information.” …
Finally, we note that despite the assertions made by the petitioners in their brief before this Court, they have produced no evidence on record sufficient to demonstrate that the 200 feet buffer zone ordered by the High Court extends to the public sidewalk or other areas beyond the court building. constitutes a public forum, “the government’s ability to allow restrictions on expressive behavior is very limited.” USA v. grace (1983). The map provided by the Commonwealth is not clear enough to resolve any ambiguity on this issue and, in any event, it does not appear to have been part of the record before a single judge….
Supreme Court case law on restrictions on picketing outside courthouses is complex.exist Cox v. Louisiana (1965), the court upheld a statute banning “pickets”[ing] or parade[ing] …close to “the court,” “with the intent to influence any judge, juror, witness, or officer of the court”; the court’s rationale seems to apply even to a restriction that does not require specific evidence of intent to influence:
There is no doubt that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting its judicial system from the pressure that pickets near courthouses can cause. Since we are committed to the rule of law rather than the rule of men, it is vital that the administration of justice be absolutely fair and orderly. This Court recognizes that the unhindered and unrestricted operation of our courts is part of the foundation of our constitutional democracy…. no doubt{[t]The constitutional guarantees relating to the fairness of criminal proceedings} embrace the basic concept of a fair trial and exclude the influence or domination of hostile or friendly mobs. There is no room for such interference at any stage of the judicial process; mob law is the exact opposite of due process. The state can take necessary and appropriate safeguards to ensure that justice at all stages is free from outside control and influence. The enactment of narrow regulations such as the one under review is clearly a necessary and appropriate safeguard to safeguard the State’s interest in securing legal justice….
Of course, it’s true that most judges are only influenced by what they see and hear in the courtroom. However, judges are human beings; the Legislature is entitled to recognize the danger that some judges, jurors and other court officials may be affected, consciously or unconsciously, by demonstrations in or near the courtroom before and during trials. States can also appropriately protect judicial proceedings from public miscarriage of justice. Suppose demonstrators marched and picketed for weeks with signs calling for the indictment to be dismissed, and a judge who was completely unaffected by these demonstrations dismissed the indictment. In such cases, the state can prevent the public from drawing the conclusion that the judge’s conduct was partly the product of intimidation and not solely the result of the fair and orderly functioning of the judicial process.
But the court’s opinion is United States v. Grace (1983) repealed the express prohibition on picketing outside the Supreme Court (which applied to individual pickets):
USA… [argues] The federal courts represent an independent branch of the government and have a different decision-making process than other branches. Court decisions are recorded in accordance with applicable law. The views of the parties and others shall be presented through presentations and oral argument. The courts are not influenced by lobbying, judges do not entertain visitors in their courts for the purpose of urging cases to be resolved in a certain way, and they do not and should not respond to marches, pickets or pressure groups.The government urges that it should not Appear Signifying to the public that the Supreme Court is subject to outside influence, or picketing or marching individually or collectively are acceptable or appropriate ways of appealing to or influencing the Supreme Court. We are therefore asked to hold that Congress had good reason to prevent the conduct at issue here from occurring on the sidewalk at the edge of the courthouse grounds….
However…we are not convinced that these prohibitions…are sufficient to maintain their effectiveness with respect to public footpaths surrounding the site. These sidewalks are for public use like other public sidewalks. There is no indication that these sidewalks are part of the Supreme Court grounds or are in any way different from other public sidewalks in the city. We seriously doubt that the public will draw any different inferences from a lone picket holding signs on the sidewalk around a building than a similar picket on the sidewalk across the street.
Therefore, we believe there is no sufficient reason [the] No signs, banners or devices are allowed on public sidewalks around buildings. We believe that the application of this section to these sidewalks is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Of course, this does not mean that those sidewalks, like other sidewalks, are not subject to reasonable restrictions on time, place, and manner…
But according to the Massachusetts court’s opinion, the challengers apparently did not sufficiently demonstrate that the buffer zone extended to ordinary city sidewalks near the courthouse.
Pamela Alford and Adam C. Lally for the state.
