Friends with Benefits: An Indian-American Story
go through Seema Siroshi
HarperCollins, 2023
Friends with Benefits: An Indian-American StoryThis work from Indian journalist Seema Sirohi is part history book and part journalistic memoir. It recounts the remarkable evolution of U.S.-India relations from hostility to partnership under five U.S. presidents and three Indian prime ministers. and India and the United States: Estranged democracies“A History of Sino-US Relations” published by retired American diplomat Dennis Cooks in 1994, wrote the history of the complex and difficult relationship between the two countries. He highlights the often confrontational anomalies in their interactions across nine consecutive U.S. presidents, from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to George Bush. Seema Sirohi picks up where he left off, chronicling the reverse evolution of their relationship from Bill Clinton to Joe Biden.
India stood on the wrong side of history after the end of the Cold War, but is determined to change course and move closer to the United States. It took some time for Washington to feel the change and start acting accordingly. Perhaps more than anyone else, Bill Clinton’s presidency epitomized the shift in U.S. policy toward India. Relations between the two countries turned from open hostility to warm rapprochement. However, the author makes it very clear that changes in Indian policy have been far less than those in the United States. Throughout Bill Clinton’s first term and much of his second, Pakistan and nonproliferation issues drove the relationship. U.S. misunderstanding of political and security dynamics in South Asia, Cold War memories of past alliances, and Pakistan’s effective lobbying have made the resolution of the Kashmir issue the focus of U.S. South Asia policy.
Tensions were heightened when India conducted a nuclear test in 1998, followed by Pakistan’s. Sanctions against India are brutal. Despite all the evidence, the US refuses to consider Pakistan-China nuclear collusion. In this state of affairs, economic considerations for China play a greater role than for Pakistan, although the quality of Islamabad’s diplomacy also plays a role. It was only after the Kargil War in 1999 that Bill Clinton changed course and reconsidered America’s relations with Pakistan and India. Kargil opened the eyes of many Americans to broader engagement with India, whose economy was slowly but effectively becoming more important and therefore more attractive. Still, the nuclear test itself convinced the U.S. government that India could no longer be ignored. A series of subsequent discussions between Strobe Talbot and Jaswant Singh paved the way for reconciliation. The China issue has also become more salient, but somewhat ambivalently, as the United States is attracted by Clinton’s willingness to engage in economic cooperation with Beijing, which is about to join the World Trade Organization, Sirohi said.
The significance of this rapprochement first became apparent in 2000, at the turn of the century, when a US president visited India for the first time since Jimmy Carter. India’s foreign policy is entering a new era. However, relations flourished under new President George W. Bush, a relationship that was greatly boosted by Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and the September 11 attacks on the United States during his first term. The attacks suddenly and dramatically increased the convergence of U.S. interests. The US government formally announced it in 2005 but began during Bush’s first term a gradual decoupling of policies toward Pakistan and India, allowing for more ambitious policies centered around the idea that India could play a greater role among emerging nations role.
These policies were implemented during Bush’s second term through the US-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement. The announcement in 2005 triggered a fierce administrative battle in Washington that, for India alone, reversed decades of nonproliferation policy and led to a complete change in the paradigm of relations between the two countries. Even so, it took a lot of effort to convince Indian leaders to sign the deal. The relationship transformed during the Bush years, firmly rooted in new and impressive popular support in both countries. The points Sima Siroshi makes here particularly reflect those of yesteryear in India, one of the very few countries where George Bush remained popular despite the war in Iraq.
By contrast, Sirohi believes relations between the two countries were in retreat under Barack Obama. Soon after Obama was elected, India-US relations seemed to have returned to the bad state of the past. The administration’s initial rhetoric reverted to Pakistan-friendly rhetoric in Washington, trade difficulties multiplied and scandals spread. Personal factors also come into play, starting with the complex and intense personalities of actors like Richard Holbrooke and John Kerry, whose undeniable talents seem to be matched by an equal ignorance of South Asian realities. At the same time, despite his personal sympathy for Manmohan Singh, Barack Obama was not truly invested in relations with India. With Narendra Modi coming to power (which the author welcomes), a new actor has emerged, one who is deeply aware of the country’s structural weaknesses but determined to use the strengths of the American system to help change the situation. China once again helped maintain relations between the two countries. There is progress in military cooperation, but the focus is on Beijing.
If the Obama presidency was an era of relative stagnation in India-US relations, things are about to change in rather strange ways. As Sirohi describes it, among American presidents and their relationship with India, Donald Trump is a paradox. His personal mentality is perhaps most incompatible with – if not outright opposed to – anything imaginable in India. However, his presidency is widely seen as beneficial to relations with India. New Delhi benefited from prevailing circumstances, smart diplomacy, and the cooperation of a knowledgeable few in the U.S. government. Contrary to the situation under Clinton, the Pakistani element now heightened by Afghanistan has not been mitigated by the need to persuade China to join the WTO. On the contrary, a tariff war with Beijing will only make the latter’s alliance with Pakistan and its duplicity in Afghanistan more difficult to accept. Of course, Trump has repeatedly attacked India’s tariff policy. However, the National Security Council’s smart and knowledgeable advisers were able to compensate for the U.S. president’s simplistic and ill-considered outbursts, while Indian diplomats cunningly used Trump’s family and romantic connections to influence him. Therefore, Trump’s presidency is a net gain for India.
However, as Joe Biden’s first term draws to a close, relations appear to have stabilized. India and the United States are no longer estranged. The relationship isn’t even comparable to what it was like at the beginning of the Clinton era. However, it remains somewhat uncertain. Past misunderstandings disappeared, but new difficulties emerged. While both countries remain complacent and emphasize democratic convergence, India’s current political trends are increasingly unsettling to India’s friends. As the author puts it, “shared values and human rights issues may bring new pressures” (p. 461). Strategic convergence toward China remains the main glue between the two countries, but political dynamics on both sides could once again strain relations.
friends with benefits Provides interesting insights into New Delhi’s diplomacy. Indian diplomats and politicians learned how to game the American political system much faster than American diplomats and politicians learned to game the Indian political system. The book highlights the malleability of the American political system, which is constantly torn between competing interests and influences and unclear about the reality of the world it pretends to regulate. But it also highlights the decisive role of the U.S. president in foreign policy. Relations with India changed under Clinton and flourished under Bush because both men were personally involved and extremely active. This stabilized under their successors, who showed a relative lack of personal interest despite public appearances to the contrary.
The book also provides the most accurate account of Modi’s foreign policy. In essence, the Indian prime minister is firmly following in the footsteps of his predecessors, who to a large extent set the contours of India’s foreign policy after 1992. Adopt very innovative strategies. In the process, he has succeeded in blurring the view of his regime, whose values are questionable, with a decidedly modern narrative about economics, technology and strategic proximity to the United States.
For those interested in the history of bilateral relations, Friends with Benefits: An Indian-American Story It’s a well of information, full of insights and anecdotes. Sirohi’s perception and understanding, passion, disillusionment and occasional anger can be felt throughout the book. However, they never took precedence over the history she witnessed, but that was her history too. However, bias is not entirely absent. The narrative of American-Indian history is written from an Indian point of view, and the author does not always hide his bias. The book would be better with a larger, more in-depth background description. The constraints faced by an established global superpower were inevitably different from those of emerging powers at the time, but these constraints were not adequately addressed. However, this lack of objectivity – which should not be confused with a lack of honesty – does add to the interest of the book. Furthermore, the author’s careful and constant presence and her sense of humor make it an easy and enjoyable read. In a long list of publications on India and the United States, Friends with Benefits: An Indian-American Story stand out. By all accounts, this is a must-read.
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