exist United States v. Goodwindecided Tuesday, Judges Florence Pan and Bradley Garcia denied an emergency motion to stay the decision on the grounds that:
The appellant did not meet the strict requirements for a stay of appeal. look Nken v. holder556 United States 418, 434 (2009); DC Circuit Practices and Internal Procedures Manual 33(2021).
Justice Gregory Casas dissented:
This appeal involves the imposition of computer surveillance as a special condition of supervised release on a defendant convicted of mistakenly entering the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Restricted Building or Grounds count, in violation of 18 USC § 1752(a)(1). Goodwin entered the Capitol and remained inside for a total of 36 seconds. He entered without using force, did not attack police officers, and did not take or damage any government property. When police directed Goodwin to leave the building, he did so.
The district court sentenced Goodwin to 60 days in jail, followed by one year of supervised release. As a special condition of supervised release, the court He volunteered The probation office was ordered to monitor Goodwin’s computer to prevent it from transmitting “false information” about Jan. 6. Regular unannounced searches.”
On appeal, this court set aside that condition. We think “[t]The district court clearly erred in imposing the computer monitoring condition by failing to consider whether it was ‘reasonably related’ to the relevant sentencing factors and involved ‘no more deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary’ to achieve the purpose behind the sentence. A district court that wishes to impose new computer monitoring conditions on remand should “explain its reasoning,” “establish a record supporting its decision,” and ensure that the conditions are consistent with section 3583(d) and consistent with the Constitution.
The district court reimposed the same conditions on remand. During an oral hearing, the court said Goodwin’s statements on social media “could, in my view, be construed” as urging a repeat of the events of January 6, especially “after another election”. In the written order, the court detailed Goodwin’s “relevant online activities.” This includes exhortations to post “#StopTheSteal!” and “#FightForTrump,” raising donations for his trip to Washington, posing for a live broadcast inside the Capitol, confirming via text message that he was there, and tweeting comments such as: “They want a revolution. They’re proving our point. In addressing the court’s claim that Goodwin pushed a “false narrative” about January 6 after the fact, the court cited the government’s brief to Goodwin’s appearance on Tucker Carr on Fox News Channel. Sen’s interview” was dominated by the fact. Ultimately, the court concluded that the computer surveillance was reasonably related to Goodwin’s criminal conduct and reasoned that the surveillance would prevent Goodwin from raising funds to support potential future crimes and would ” Separate yourself from extremist media and allow him to recover.”
Goodwin appealed and asked for a stay of execution. I would grant the motion because, in my opinion, Goodwin is likely to prevail on the merits and has shown immediate irreparable harm. See Nken v. holder (Factors for stay pending appeal).
As for the likelihood of success, United States v. Burroughs (DC Cir. 2010) objected to the imposition of the computer surveillance conditions at issue here. There, a defendant was convicted of sex crimes against minors, including providing a pimp for a minor, and was sentenced to 192 months in prison. The district court imposed a supervised release condition of computer monitoring, which the government defended on the grounds that “the Internet can be used to arrange sexual encounters with minors and to advertise prostitution for minors.” Even in a simple error review, we were quick to dismiss this argument: “Of course you can. But from drug dealers to Ponzi schemes, from smugglers to stalkers, almost any criminal can use the Internet to facilitate illegal behavior.”
Burroughs The offenses involved were more serious and sustained than the one-off wrongful entry offense committed by Goodwin. If concerns about using the Internet to commit future crimes or threaten others are not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 3583(d) Burroughsit may not be enough here. Furthermore, the First Amendment significantly limits the government’s ability to prohibit false speech, United States v. Alvarez (2012); Speech advocating the use of force, brandenburg v ohio (1969); or threatening remarks, Watts v. United States (1969) (per Kurim). At this point, I doubt that the vague and broad “disinformation” ban on January 6 would survive First Amendment scrutiny under those standards, which recognize that “language in the political arena…often Abusive, insulting and inaccurate”.
As for irreparable harm, the law states that “the loss of First Amendment freedoms, even for the shortest period of time, undoubtedly constitutes irreparable harm.” So whether or not we believe Goodwin’s further assertion that he would lose his job as a reporter if the government was allowed to monitor his computers, this factor supports Goodwin.
The third and fourth suspending factors, involving harm to the immovable party and the public interest, were combined in this case and did not provide independent support to the government. Both sides treat these factors as afterthoughts. Because the two most important stay considerations favor Goodwin and there is no public interest in enforcing potentially unlawful speech restrictions, I will grant the motion for a stay.
