After the 2012 parliamentary elections, the Georgia Dream Party came to power, marking the first transfer of power in Georgia’s history. As a coalition party, it concluded the EU-Georgia Association Agreement (2014-2016) and the Visa Liberalization (2017). Initially, it appeared to be a willing democrat. However, its latest authoritarian transgression is the passing of a controversial “Foreign Influence Transparency” law (May 28, 2024). The law is intended to weaken local democratic forces and insulate Georgia from international democratic pressure.
Since independence, Georgia has been committed to joining the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The rationale behind Euro-Atlantic integration is simple and clear – to contain Russian political and military aggression and to achieve economic growth and political stability through Western integration. The issue of territorial integrity is a dominant factor in Georgia’s alliance with NATO, while EU integration is seen as a driver of democratic consolidation. The United States and the European Union jointly support Georgia’s statehood. On the contrary, Russia repeatedly supported the separatist forces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early days of Georgia’s independence in an attempt to undermine Georgia’s statehood. These separatist conflicts led to the ethnic cleansing and internal displacement of Georgians. Additionally, Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008. No previous administration had attempted to change its Western orientation, given the high electoral costs of such a move. However, it is puzzling that the Georgian government, led by the “Georgian Dream”, made the risky decision to form an alliance with Russia.
The United States, the European Union and NATO are important promoters of democracy in Georgia. Since independence, Western democrats have collectively supported their nation- and democracy-building projects, investing billions of dollars and spreading knowledge about good governance. The Georgian government is willing to accept this democratic assistance. This openness is considered an important factor in achieving desirable democratic outcomes. Reliable local partners are the internal backbone to avoid unintended consequences of international democracy assistance. Democracy promoters have succeeded in Georgia and elsewhere when they have empowered democratic veto holders among political elites, as well as in civil society and the media—three key areas critical to consolidating democracy and establishing the rule of law . However, the passage of the Foreign Influence Transparency Act shows that the Georgian government is more willing to sever political ties with the West by excluding such an important domestic veto power.
The Georgian government is revealing its ambiguity and stumbling on the European path. The October 2024 congressional elections are likely to show how electorally costly this shift in foreign policy could be for the ruling party. So far, the “Georgian Dream” has successfully used rhetoric to create fear, claiming that the Russia-Ukraine war may lead to the spread of regional war and undermine Georgia’s stability. At this politically decisive moment, the Georgian government did not take a clear position, but said: “Whoever is not against us is for us,” which can be understood as a tacit sensitivity to Russian authoritarian pressure.
Although Russia is waging a self-destructive war in Ukraine, it can still foment instability by using its proxies to pit opposing political forces against each other and by spreading its authoritarian policies abroad. In addition, Russia has geopolitical motives for disrupting Georgia’s security. After the Russia-Ukraine war, the EU sought a safe economic and energy route to minimize the negative impact of the EU’s energy dependence on Russia. This was a strategic mistake aimed at temporarily curbing Russia’s authoritarian policies. The instability fomented by Russia aims to destabilize regional peace and disrupt the course of the global economy. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor, connects China and Europe. Russia wants to limit this connectivity and maintain its advantages relatively China and Europe have tightened their control over the South Caucasus region, which connects the Caspian and Black Sea regions.
Likewise, Russia supports Georgia’s authoritarian turn and seeks to counter international democratization efforts by weakening pro-democracy forces and spreading authoritarian norms—as well as supporting illiberal forces unwilling to cooperate with Western actors. For example, the EU granted Georgia candidate country status in December 2023. Authoritarian pressure on the Georgian government to force it to accept EU accession negotiations. These violations can also be explained by the unwillingness of the Georgian ruling elite to comply with EU policies and limit their political power in order to promote Georgia’s Europeanization and subsequent democratization. This strategic decision will push Georgian citizens to free themselves from Russian influence and defend their values-based democratic choices in the upcoming parliamentary elections in October 2024.
The Foreign Influence Transparency Act has two domestic consequences. First, it is anti-constitutional because it goes against the spirit of Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires the constitutional authorities to take all measures to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO. Secondly, senior EU and US officials condemned the passage of the law as inconsistent with EU values and Georgia’s declared strategic foreign policy objectives. The law does not allow pro-democracy forces to participate in politics and causes reputational damage to civil society organizations and the media by stigmatizing them as foreign agents, thereby prompting their exclusion.
The current election setup and new regulations add to the complexity and uncertainty of Georgia’s elections. Article 109 of the Electoral Code allocates parliamentary seats to parties that obtain at least 5% of the valid votes cast. Article 125 outlines the method for calculating the number of seats awarded to each party. Because of the high electoral threshold and these calculation rules, opposition parties have an incentive to form alliances to improve their chances of winning more seats. Article 766 Allows electronic voting using ballots with barcodes and QR codes, counting by electronic voting machines, and instant reporting of results. Therefore, domestic observers need to receive thorough training to ensure that electronic voting machines comply with Georgia election laws. These circumstances prompted Georgian Dream to reintroduce and pass the Foreign Influence Transparency Act, which had previously been withdrawn due to electoral fragility.
Local non-governmental organizations monitored the electoral process through observation missions. The law could impose restrictions on NGOs and media in the pre-election period and on election day, with hefty fines and confiscation of property if they fail to comply. In a post-election environment, Russian-inspired laws could be used as political bargaining tools as Georgia dreams of a coalition government. Its subsidiary parties and suspected satellite parties have less chance of breaking through the 5% electoral threshold in congressional elections. However, by using the Foreign Influence Transparency Act to restrict international observers, the government would jeopardize the legitimacy of parliamentary elections and force the opposition to mobilize voters on the streets to defend democracy. Arguably, in such a situation, Russia might consider military intervention or authorize its proxies to foment civil unrest.
There are three main scenarios for the upcoming election. First, if the opposition regroups strategically, appeals to median voters and downplays the role of divisive former president Saakashvili, they can win a majority and form a government. This requires joint electoral lists, regional campaigning and strong leadership. The pro-European opposition front has pledged to defeat the Georgian Dream and return Georgia to the European orbit, and took the first step towards achieving this goal by signing a pro-European declaration in Brussels on June 24, 2024. The party’s unity also appeals to soft supporters of the Georgian Dream, who are disillusioned with recent shifts in foreign policy.
Second, Georgian Dream will win the majority. However, Georgia Dream is unlikely to win a simple majority due to widespread dissatisfaction and opposition among young voters. Despite the use of administrative resources, the party faces moral disadvantages stemming from U.S. sanctions and corruption scandals. Full dictatorship is impossible due to limited resources, potential backlash from cutting ties with the West, and popular demand for democracy (63% of citizens support a coalition government).
Finally, another scenario is the formation of a coalition government. The opposition parties may form two major groups, increasing the chances of the opposition parties and GD forming a coalition government. One group could include parties supporting President Zurabishvili’s Georgian Charter and opposition parties that have broken away from the Georgian Dream, while another group could include the New Mexico Movement and other allied parties. Accession talks and potential EU sanctions against authoritarian leaders could facilitate power-sharing with Georgian Dream. However, this situation may create instability but may also facilitate consensus-building and strengthen Georgia’s democratic future.
Further reading on electronic international relations
