The Indo-Pacific occupies a considerable position in strategic and geopolitical discourse and has essentially replaced the term “Asia-Pacific” to convey the regional views of many countries and expand the scope of economic and security cooperation. The Indo-Pacific region is vast and includes many subregions, including the east coast of Africa, the Indian Ocean region, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Oceania, and the west coast of the United States. It outlines the shift of power to Asia and recognizes the growing links between developments in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Its strategic construction is of great significance to India, which is a key player in the so-called newly defined “strategic competition theater”. This is clearly encouraged by, if not based on, China’s competition and security concerns and its expanding economic, political and military engagement over the past decade.
In order to consolidate its strategic position in the Indo-Pacific region, India has established “issue-based” partnerships that will help promote regional order while maintaining India’s strategic autonomy. India’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific is motivated by a desire to find a balance between geopolitical competition with China and renewed partnership with the West. India favors multipolarity and has strengthened its foreign policy participation in multilateral forums such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Mekong-Ganges Cooperation, the Quadrilateral Dialogue (Quad), the East Asia Summit, etc., such as the Indo-Pacific Islands Forum, etc. , these organizations aim to serve as a bridge between the Indo-Pacific sub-region. In the past decade, India has developed closer economic and security cooperation with major powers such as the United States, Japan, France, and Australia, as well as with countries in the Southeast Asian region. For India, the Indo-Pacific provides an important avenue for improving economic relations with regional partners and promoting India as an important investment destination. The new Indo-Pacific security partnership has also led to a renewed focus on conducting joint military training and military exercises to improve defense interoperability and enhance domain awareness among Indo-Pacific powers, as well as an active focus on maritime security – particularly in the Indian Ocean – Key areas of interest for India.
While political leaders, diplomats, and the foreign policy bureaucracy have been relevant actors shaping India’s Indo-Pacific security policy, as Scott points out, “Indian think tanks have been the primary focus of India’s push for Indo-Pacific remit since 2011. important tool. Overall, since the mid-to-late 2000s, think tanks have provided impetus for a framework that emphasizes India’s position in the Indo-Pacific. They have highlighted India’s security considerations in the Indian Ocean, drawn attention to the need for maritime diplomacy, and Collaborating with other countries in the region to further develop India’s maritime capabilities. For example, early emphasis on the Indian Ocean has been a steady focus for think tanks such as the National Maritime Foundation (NMF), an arm of the Indian Navy, and other Indian think tanks such as Developing Countries Research and Development. information system, which had a key role in developing the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) program in 1997, as the current Indian government focuses on the Indo-Pacific region, including the Observer Research Foundation (ORF). , Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (MP-IDSA), think tanks such as Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), India Foundation (IF)) and others have been at the forefront of discussions.
Through research, think tanks have helped amplify the prevailing narrative about the Indo-Pacific and highlighted India’s strategic value within this framework. Think tank research and policy engagement provide avenues for discussions on key initiatives such as India’s strategic partnership with Indo-Pacific partner countries and various defense exercises, training and dialogues. Through existing networks with government agencies such as the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Prime Minister’s Office, the think tank participates in multi-track dialogues and key government initiatives. Events organized by think tanks also provide a platform for multi-stakeholder participation and public debate on India’s Indo-Pacific security policy.
While think tanks have always been high-profile players, as evident from their active research and public engagement on India’s security issues in the Indo-Pacific, why should we care about think tanks? In order to answer this question, it is important to consider some key aspects of Indian think tanks more generally and specifically. By definition, think tanks can be viewed as actors, agents, or simply institutions narrowly focused on academic research. A generally accepted definition describes think tanks as organizations distinct from government whose goal is to provide advice on a variety of policy issues through the use of specialized knowledge and activation of networks. They are often referred to as civil society organizations or policy research institutions, but their definitions vary due to their different development histories. For example, the American definition emphasizes the civil society context, while European scholars define think tanks as practice-oriented, science-based organizations. The bridging role of think tanks has been a dominant theme in the academic literature, with think tanks characterized as organizations engaged in research and advocacy on policy-relevant issues, serving as a bridge between knowledge and power or between civil society and formal government organizations. For example, while emphasizing the role of think tanks in promoting India’s Indo-Pacific discourse, Scott referred to think tanks such as ORF or NMF as “quasi-official bridges between external governments and governments, and their Indo-Pacific meetings often include ministers”, officials and diplomats.
However, the bridging role has been challenged by Diane Stone because “[t]he complex relationship between experts and public policy imposes a dualism that sees science as one side of the bridge and the state as the other”. Stone emphasized the symbiotic and interdependent relationship between knowledge and policy, concluding that “think tanks are not bridges, but embodiments of the knowledge/power relationship.” While think tanks promote policy ideas and provide a way for ideas to gain supporters and inform the substantive basis of policy debate, they are not benign creatures who exercise power and agency in the policy-making process to pursue their own organizational interests.
India is one of the countries with the longest history of think tanks in South Asia, with 612 think tanks, ranking third in the world in terms of number of think tanks. While Indian think tanks are largely understood as informal or non-governmental policy actors, they are better described as hybrid actors with significant links to formal policy-making institutions. The funding patterns and membership composition of these institutions also reveal their close ties to government actors, significantly enhancing their relative ability to influence foreign policy. Think tank experts often come from similar professional backgrounds and have experienced common training methods. The Indian government has a long history of supporting these experts and institutionalizing foreign policy think tanks. Indian think tanks often rely on government funding and/or are vulnerable to government control due to regulations regarding foreign funding. They may then be asked about their research autonomy or research independence.
However, the relationship between the state and think tanks in India is not linear. For example, on Indo-Pacific security issues, think tanks have provided direct policy input into this new framework because of their institutional connections to multilateral environmental agreements and program management offices. For example, as early as 2007-2008, think tanks such as NMF emphasized the Indo-Pacific region in maritime cooperation with Japan and competition with China. Think tank events and organized dialogues, such as the prestigious Resina Dialogue organized annually by ORF in partnership with MEA, make significant contributions to the public debate on security policy in the Indo-Pacific region. Armed forces think tanks such as MP-IDSA, NMF, Center for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) and Center for Air Power Studies (CAPS), funded and supported by the Indian Ministry of Defense and the Navy, Army and Air Force respectively, organized events and debates and reviewed the Indo-Pacific region. Military operations generated intense interest. Indian policymakers in turn use think tanks as platforms to promote and amplify policy narratives about India’s engagement in the Quad or the Indo-Pacific region. In addition to directly benefiting from government funding, Indian think tanks such as the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) and IF, which are ideologically affiliated with the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, also provide opportunities to expand the Modi government’s defense and foreign policy preferences. An important platform. VIF and the IF’s ongoing ties with India’s foreign policy establishment are significantly enhanced by close ties with India’s current national security adviser (who is close to Modi and the external affairs minister) and VIF’s founding director Ajit Doval.
Although the involvement of think tanks is strong, it needs to be treated with caution. Simply focusing on the ideas promoted by think tanks is incomplete – it is equally important to investigate and highlight the extent to which these think tanks are embedded in India’s foreign policy architecture – which affects the value and ability of their ideas to be communicated to policymakers. The independence of think tank research relies heavily on the support of formal institutions with invisible horizontal links to government actors, which enhances their ability to influence policy but also raises concerns about their constructive criticism of government policy direction. Questioning ability. Therefore, policy implications need to be understood within these constraints.
Further reading on electronic international relations
