Andreas Umland is an analyst at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. Umlan is headquartered in Kiev.
Andreas Umland is also an associate professor of political science at the Mohyla Institute of Kyiv State University. Umland holds a PhD in political science from the University of Cambridge, a PhD in history and a diploma in political science from the University of Berlin, a master’s degree in Russian studies from the University of Oxford, and a master’s degree in political science from Stanford University. Umland is a fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center, and has held academic appointments at Ural State University in Yekaterinburg, St. Anthony’s College in Oxford, Shevchenko University in Kiev, Catholic University of Eichstadt, and Yekaterinburg. Take a university teaching position. he is” Same as above Journalistic book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society” and “Voices of Ukraine”. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the International Association for Comparative Fascist Studies and the Boris Nemtsov Academic Center for Russian Studies at Charles University in Prague.
Where you can see the most exciting research/debates happening In your field?
After a two-decade freeze, the debate over Russia’s future scenarios has become interesting again in East European studies. An intriguing question is the correlation between the success or failure of Russia’s external expansionist, imperialist and hegemonic policies and Russia’s internal affairs, regime stability and political culture – in other words, how will Russia’s military defeat in Ukraine affect Russian politics? system.
In comparative fascist studies (another area of my research), the most interesting discussion concerns Oleksandr Zaitsev’s new concept of “Ustashism” as an illiberal or Revolutionary, ultra-nationalism in an incomplete state. In Zaitsev’s view, Ustashism is different from the extremism of nominal nations in established nation-states (i.e., fascism). This revolutionary, radical ethnocentric movement aspired to establish a nation-state for its minority communities.
How come? the way you understand As the world has changed over time, what (or who) prompted the most significant shifts in your thinking?
With years of experience, I have come to appreciate the role that institutions play in society. Like many social science students, I started out with an egalitarian perspective and leaned toward anarchism. Institutions can be criticized as instruments of oppressive power, imposing unequal opportunities, suppressing minorities, suppressing dissent, etc. This is illustrated by the decline or disappearance of institutions in territories ravaged by invasion and war.
The lesson of the past few years is how important certain words are to understanding or misunderstanding a given situation. “Fascism” and “nationalism” are important words in Western (not to mention Russian) interpretations of Ukraine’s contemporary history and current politics. But what do you do with these terms after Ukrainians elected a predominantly Russian-speaking Jew as president in 2019 with 73% of the vote—the best result ever for a Ukrainian presidential candidate?
What impact will Putin’s re-election and the recent terrorist attacks in Moscow have on the war in Ukraine in the coming months?
They may all contribute to further escalation of the situation. However, none of these events were particularly devastating. Russia’s policy toward Ukraine is primarily driven by other factors, such as the course of the war in Ukraine and Russia’s socioeconomic development. Perhaps there is another proverbial “black swan” coming that we don’t know about yet. Disruption is possible and, I suspect, even possible. However, it may not arise within domestic political systems, which currently appear to be frozen, but rather as a function of economic, social or foreign developments. Only in the second stage will the structural fragility of Putin’s system be highlighted due to over-centralization and insufficient institutionalization. In particular, the current regime will face problems in ensuring Putin’s succession because there are no established mechanisms—such as dynastic principles, clearly defined electors, democratic elections, etc.—that can guide, structure, and regulate the transfer of power.
In a recent article New Eastern Europeyou said, “Only through reasonable military deterrence to prevent the situation from escalating again can future peace be ensured.” [from Russia]”. What would such a deterrent look like? Do you see a clear role for US/NATO forces?
This deterrence can take many forms. As we all know, Kyiv’s preferred solution to this problem is for Ukraine to join NATO. However, after two years of observing Sweden’s difficulties in joining NATO in 2022-24, I am now more skeptical than before that Ukraine will formally join NATO anytime soon. At the same time, Ukraine’s security requires an alliance between the West and some non-Western countries willing to send troops to Ukraine. These foreign contingents could protect Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, the security of foreign embassies in Kiev, and guard Ukraine’s lifeline of transportation for imports of materials, including weapons, and exports of grain and other food products. In addition, Ukraine needs to create a well-equipped European army with high defensive and offensive capabilities, and its defense industry needs to become one of the most productive in the world.
Putin regularly propose the idea Russia and Ukraine are one country because they Common past. What role does this historical assertion play in Russia’s foreign policy and strategic goals?
This idea – rather than a supposed defense against NATO enlargement – was the key motivation for the outbreak of war in 2014. Recent relevant texts include Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s seminal 1990 essay How We Should Build Russia and Alexander Dugin’s popular 1997 The international relations textbook “Foundations of Geopolitics”.
The West believes that NATO’s eastward expansion is the main trigger of Russia’s behavior. However, there are many signs that NATO poses a competitor rather than a threat to Moscow, and that other drivers of expansionism are more critical. For example, Moldova adopted a constitution in 1994 that established the country’s neutral status and excluded NATO membership. Since that year, Moldova has been waiting for Russian troops to withdraw from its territory, but that has not yet happened.
Another example is Russia’s withdrawal of troops from its western and northern military districts, that is, the eastern and southern regions of Finland, during Finland’s application and approval to join NATO in 2022-23. This occurred despite Finland’s accession leading to a semi-siege by NATO of Putin, Medvedev and Patrushev’s hometown of St. Petersburg, stretching from Estonia in the west to Finland in the north. To sum up, what triggered Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2014 and its full-scale invasion in 2022 was ultra-nationalist pan-Russianism, not security considerations.
How do you currently assess Western support for Ukraine?
By the end of April, a number of positive announcements about 2024 support had been made. However, questions remain as to when and how the promised deliveries will arrive and be used in the war effort. Hopefully, the West will fully deliver on its lengthy commitments. The outlook for 2025 is even more worrying because it is uncertain whether the Western alliance will still support Ukraine.
What are the long-term effects of Western sanctions on Russia in the diplomatic and economic spheres?
Moscow believes, or at least publicly claims, that it can easily compensate for the loss of Western economic and political partners by strengthening old partnerships or forging new ones with Asian and other non-Western countries. But it’s not as easy as it seems. As long as the Western sanctions regime exists, Moscow’s potential non-Western partners will be limited in their cooperation with Russia.
Worse still for Russia, there is no alternative economic and political integration framework to the European and Western integration projects that the West offered Moscow in the 1990s and early 2000s. That year, Russia joined the Council of Europe, the Group of Seven became the Group of Eight, the EU and Russia signed a cooperation agreement, and the NATO-Russia Special Council was established.
Most of Russia’s partnerships outside Europe will be situational and reflect the partners’ narrow national interests. Moscow will work hard to establish long-term, win-win cooperation plans with non-Western countries. Many will happily exploit Russia’s current isolation and rich natural resources, but few will seek full alliance or integration with Russia – as the EU and NATO once wanted to do.
What is the most important advice you can give? A young scholar of international relations?
Be experienced! Theories are useful tools for hypothesis formulation and concept formation, but they are not a master key to explaining everything. If you don’t know much about the history, politics, and culture of the country you want to study, you may end up imposing an irrelevant theoretical framework and drawing erroneous conclusions.
Sometimes self-described “realists” in international relations scholars like George Friedman of Stratford University or John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago are curiously inclined to ignore the realities they face. They struck me as “non-realists” whose extra-empirical thinking confounded the audience. They derive parallel worlds from so-called universal theories, and the descriptions of these parallel worlds contribute little to understanding and solving practical problems. For example, Mearsheimer’s speculation on Germany’s future place in Europe in his 2001 masterpiece The tragedy of great power politics This will come as a surprise to readers who were familiar with contemporary German history 20 years ago. Not surprisingly, his “realist” predictions have nothing to do with the evolution of actual German foreign affairs over the past two decades.
Understanding theory will help deepen your initial hypotheses and design your research plan. However, the main purpose of the investigation should be to understand the historical evolution and character of the confrontation between the parties to the conflict that you are concerned with. Look for possibilities to compare the situation you are investigating diachronically or simultaneously with similar situations in the past or elsewhere! The role of a theory is to generate possible explanations that can be tested, modified, or falsified. They should not be preached as a catechism, nor should they be followed as a religion.
Further reading on electronic international relations
