Campbell Craig is Professor of International Relations at Cardiff University. He has held senior research positions at the University of Bristol, the Norwegian Nobel Institute, the European University Institute and Yale University. He specializes in the history of U.S. foreign policy, international relations theory, and nuclear politics, and he has written extensively on these topics. he is Destroying a Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War (Columbia University Press, 1998); Glimmers of the New Leviathan: Realist Total War by Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz (Columbia University Press, 2003); The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War (Yale University Press, 2008), co-authored with Sergey Radchenko; and America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (2nd ed.; Harvard University Press, 2020), co-authored with Fredrik Logevall. A list of his publications can be found here.
Where do you see the most exciting research/debates in your field?
One of the most interesting debates has to do with American ascendancy and unipolarity. Is unipolarity still relevant today? If so, what impact would it have on U.S. foreign policy? Another more specific debate I was involved in was over the nuclear revolution – the argument, systematically advanced by Robert Jervis in the 1980s, that the emergence of thermonuclear bombs and intercontinental missiles made large-scale war insane, creating conditions for inevitable mutually assured destruction and will force major powers to value stability and compromise in harsh security competition. Recently, some scholars have questioned this argument, arguing that the nuclear powers did not behave as Jervis imagined and that the nuclear revolution was a “myth.” This is a very important debate because if this new argument is accepted by those shaping U.S. nuclear policy, they are likely to argue for a strategy of nuclear superiority against competitors such as Russia and especially China. Some of these new scholars believe that the United States has no choice but to do this. I don’t agree with this.
How has the way you understand the world changed over time?
I did conclude that domestic politics has a much greater impact on U.S. foreign policy than I previously thought. Just look at what Biden is doing now to see how obvious this is. The person who influenced me most in this regard was my co-author Fred Logevall. In writing a history of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, we struggled to figure out how to make this argument convincingly. One way we do this is by emphasizing the effect of “liberal security”—the idea that the United States generally does not face imminent threats to its national survival in the way that previous great powers did. This gives U.S. politicians greater freedom to let domestic influence influence their foreign policy positions because the risk of error is low. We saw this play out today.
What is Trotsky’s Unbalanced and Comprehensive Development? Is it still relevant to modern geopolitics and the nuclear revolution?
Trotsky’s concept of Unbalanced and Comprehensive Development (UCD) is very, very close to classical realism. I strongly encourage everyone to drop what they are doing and read Justin Rosenberg’s work on UCD and his engagement with realists such as Kenneth Waltz. I wrote in an article a few years ago that Marxism-Leninism became obsolete with the nuclear revolution because it (unlike classical Marxism) envisioned large-scale war, the inevitable war of capitalism, as revolution and eventual world victory The key catalyst for Marxism. But if such a war kills humans, then this plan is no longer valid. Khrushchev realized this in the late 1950s. I consider his decision to embrace the implications of the nuclear revolution to be one of the most important events of the twentieth century.
You have Express Only through the creation of a world state and an end to international anarchy can the threat of nuclear weapons be eliminated. Why is this a better alternative to further enforcement of the existing nonproliferation regime?
I’m glad you asked this question because I’m writing about this regime right now. The nonproliferation regime cannot save us from the danger of nuclear war because it has done nothing and has chosen to do nothing about the nuclear arsenals of the great powers. Moreover, over the past few decades it has increasingly become an explicit arm of U.S. foreign policy. I think (and so did people like Hans Morgenthau and Albert Einstein) that if we want to eliminate the possibility of nuclear war, really eliminate it, then only a world government can do that. As I wrote in a recent commentary, complete and irreversible disarmament will not work in a world of anarchy. We can muddle along with deterrence, but as Martin Amis once wrote, “The problem with deterrence is that it cannot last for the necessary span of time, roughly between now and the death of the sun.” I know world governments seem to be totally unsatisfied Maybe, especially recently, I’m also aware of the dangers that come with it. My point is that we must face up to what is necessary to eliminate the specter of nuclear war and accept logical answers, no matter how utopian or outlandish they may seem. Otherwise, admit that you are okay with eventually annihilating ourselves.
What is the power advantage theory? What impact does the proliferation of nuclear weapons have on the United States’ power advantage?
Power advantage is a theory developed by Dartmouth international relations scholars Steve Brooks and Bill Wolforth. They argue that the persistence of unipolarity—the fact that no country or alliance of countries has attempted to compete with U.S. power since the end of the Cold War—can be explained by realist factors. The gap in military capabilities, especially technological capabilities, between the United States and other countries is so great that potential competitors find it too difficult to overcome. Moreover, these potential opponents are all located in the Eastern Hemisphere, which means that if they really try to build up their military strength to compete with the United States, they may alarm neighboring countries and trigger regional security competition that they would rather avoid.
As Nuno Monteiro and I have argued, nuclear proliferation is a fundamental problem for a dominant United States because if you can acquire a small number of nuclear weapons, you can deter U.S. coercion and attack. If the United States wants to use its advantages to let other countries do whatever it wants, it cannot let them obtain nuclear bombs. This is why, as I wrote above, the United States has been interested in dominating the nonproliferation regime since the end of the Cold War.
Russia’s possible use of tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine becomes a noteworthy issue in 2022.
I think it is unlikely that states would intentionally use nuclear weapons in a conventional war unless it was a war of survival. If you have nuclear weapons, another country is unlikely to attack you with the intention of threatening your survival: this has not happened since 1945. non-nuclear adversaries? Again, very unlikely, as the costs of doing so, including the possibility of escalating to a larger-scale nuclear war, far outweigh the benefits. Most importantly, as Nina Tannenwald has argued, a country that uses nuclear weapons in such a war would become a global pariah state. I think it’s actually more likely that nuclear weapons were used accidentally or unintentionally in this situation because something went wrong or someone went crazy.
Do you expect policies or attitudes toward nuclear weapons to change in the future?
I do. Today, we see a new generation coming to believe that business-as-usual politics is unsustainable and reprehensible, whether it’s the protests in Gaza or action on climate change. New work on nuclear weapons and disarmament reflects similar sentiments. However, as I said above, I do not believe that disarmament can work without eliminating anarchy, nor do I see how it is possible to eliminate anarchy through grassroots, mass politics. I’d be happy if I could be convinced on the latter point.
What is the most important advice you can give to young scholars of international relations?
The main advice I would give is don’t aspire to work in government. If you do this, you’ll have an incentive to avoid writing or saying anything that might prevent you from getting a policy job, and that’s not what academics are supposed to do. I firmly believe that I was able to create a successful career for myself at a relatively young age by writing about what I thought was important, rather than what I thought would enhance my prospects for a career in foreign policy. Doing what I do will give you a competitive advantage.
Further reading on electronic international relations
