From Sarajevo in 1914 to Munich in 1938, historical analogies provide a cognitive shortcut to help us understand complex problems, allowing policymakers to make decisions with a minimum of original analysis. This trend is most evident in the study of U.S.-China relations, where a group of scholars take turns trying to understand and shape the world’s most important bilateral relationship by referring to the past. But for the most part, direct — and overwhelmingly Western-oriented — historical analogies have proven more likely to obscure and confuse than to illuminate and guide assessments of U.S.-China relations. More worryingly, because the most common analogies come from past wars, their irresistible appeal has the potential to create a self-fulfilling dynamic that brings countries closer to conflict.
Graham Allison’s popularization of the “Thucydides Trap” uses the eternal power of an emerging power (China) to threaten an established power (the United States) to construct Sino-US relations. Just as Sparta’s fear of the rise of Athens made the Peloponnesian War “inevitable,” Allison asserted that China’s emergence as an economic and military competitor to U.S. hegemony would push the two countries toward violent confrontation. This framework has proven to have a profound impact in foreign policy circles, with Joe Biden describing Allison as “one of the most astute observers of international affairs” and Xi Jinping repeatedly pointing out the need to avoid the Thucydides Trap .
However, the popularity of Allison’s theory among practitioners was matched by the enthusiastic attack by his colleagues on the Thucydides Trap concept and its application to Sino-American relations. While classical scholars believe that the framework stems from a misreading of Peloponnesian history, other commentators have questioned its underlying causal mechanisms, arguing that aspiring states, rather than existing states, were more likely to launch war. Other critics believe that “Thucydidean clichés” exaggerate China’s power while underestimating the geopolitical significance of China-U.S. economic interdependence and the strength of U.S. regional allies. Strategic hawks in the United States have also joined the opposition, rejecting Allison’s prescription to “accommodate” China, and believe that China’s aggressive stance is not because of the United States’ tyranny, but because the United States is absent-minded.
Allison is not the only one trying to twist history to fit China-U.S. relations (and vice versa). Drawing on the same hegemonic war theory, many commentators have drawn worrying comparisons between U.S.-China relations and the pre-1914 Anglo-German rivalry. The navy aims to challenge its established rivals for regional dominance. Viewed in this light, U.S.-China economic interdependence is less a precaution against future conflict than another eerie resemblance to pre-1914 Europe. But this analogy ignores Russia’s role in pushing Germany to go to war and ignores the importance of China’s less dangerous geostrategic environment, which could protect China from any realistic threat of invasion. In addition, the Anglo-German analogy ignores the role of nuclear deterrence in contemporary international relations and underestimates the historical contingency of Europe’s “sleepwalking” into war in July 1914.
The recent deterioration in U.S.-China relations has also seen the proliferation of “Cold War” analogies, in which China replaced the Soviet Union as the United States’ main ideological and geopolitical rival. But while reflecting China’s longstanding desire to learn from the Soviet Union’s mistakes, The analogy also fails to reflect the contemporary relationship between the two countries. It is true that China’s authoritarian state-led capitalism challenged Washington’s liberal democratic model ostensibly to mimic the ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, but China lacked the universalist ideology that shaped the dynamics of the Cold War. The depth of cultural and economic ties between the United States and China is also distinct from the divisive structure of Cold War relations, and although China’s “infinite partnership” with Russia continues to grow, China lacks the Soviet Union’s system of international alliances. Crucially, Cold War analogies can also lead to cognitive biases that exaggerate the malicious intent of both sides and misdiagnose “security-seeking” behavior as “power-seeking” ambitions.
So should we avoid comparisons and declare the U.S.-China relationship unprecedented? Of course, each country’s assertion of its own exceptionalism reflects a sense of uniqueness. Although the re-emergence of “America First” ideology under Trump has clearly challenged the idea of America’s “civilizing mission,” the United States’ status as an “extraordinary country” with “a special role in human history” continues to permeate Biden’s leadership in foreign policy. At the same time, China’s evolving but enduring sense of its own superiority—based on its sense of historical destiny as a great power—dominated Xi Jinping’s approach to international relations. There is a feeling on both sides of the Pacific that the quantitative scale of Chinese and American global dominance is qualitatively unique. The United States and China together account for 43% of the world’s GDP and more than half of global military spending. Their combined contribution to carbon dioxide emissions far exceeds that of their nearest competitors. But a bilateral relationship cannot resist all comparisons just because its protagonists see themselves as unique, or because they have unprecedented resources. Indeed, even among those who extol the uniqueness of the U.S.-China relationship, historical analogies persist. For example, Niall Ferguson’s fantasy of an interdependent “China-America” implicitly invoked the “Nichibei” that prompted America’s rise against Japan in the 1980s feel fear.
If the temptation to draw parallels to Sino-US relations cannot be overcome, improvements can be made in at least three areas. First, U.S. and Chinese commentators should draw on broader analogies to avoid cognitive biases. For example, they might wish to consider whether British and French navies proliferated in the 19th century?th Which would be a better comparison than the Anglo-German arms race, or whether Cold War analogies are best suited to America’s role in reshaping the Soviet Union. Second, analogies should focus not on the protagonists of the past but on the underlying mechanisms driving historical change. For example, as Ian Chong and Todd Hall point out, 1914 offers useful lessons about complex alliance systems, rising nationalism, and the dangers of ongoing crises without directly Compare the German Empire and China. Finally, when drawing analogies, commentators should avoid the unfounded but persistent assumption that Europe’s past will be Asia’s future and look for precedents throughout the Asia-Pacific region itself. The result might be less book sales, but it might slow the progress of the war.
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