The Supreme Court today rejected statutory interpretation of criminal charges against some of Donald Trump’s supporters who participated in the January 6, 2021, riots at the U.S. Capitol. , accusing the former president himself of illegally trying to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election.
Prosecutors claim the rioters impeded formal proceedings by interrupting Congress’ approval of the election results. In Trump’s case, they argue, he interfered with the process by promoting the fantasy of a stolen election that inspired the rioters, who were part of the group of protesters who attended rallies before the riot. At the rally, he stoked anger among supporters over President Joe Biden’s alleged illegal actions. But neither the rioters’ actions nor Trump’s actions met the elements of the crime, according to the Supreme Court.
The case involves former police officer Joseph Fischer, who was charged with obstructing an official proceeding under 18 USC 1512(c) after participating in a riot. The provision was enacted under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a law approved by Congress in 2002 in response to a financial scandal involving the accounting firm Arthur Andersen’s destruction of potentially incriminating documents. . Fisher argued that, given that context and the structure of the provision, his conduct at the Capitol, which allegedly included entering the building and confronting police, did not meet the requirements of the statute to prosecute someone.
Six justices agreed. writing for most people Fisher v. United StatesChief Justice John Roberts said that proving a violation of Section 1512(c) requires “establishing[ing] The defendant damaged the availability or integrity of records, documents, objects used in formal proceedings” or “other items used in the proceedings, or attempted to do so”.
Section 1512(c)(1) applies to any person who “corruptly … alters, destroys, destroys, or conceals a record, document, or other item, or attempts to do so with intent to impair the integrity or availability of the item” in a formal proceeding middle. Section 1512(c)(2), a provision used in Capitol riot cases, applies to anyone who “otherwise obstructs, affects or prevents any official proceeding or attempts to do so.” Both are felonies punishable by up to 20 years in prison.
The key question, Roberts said, is “whether this ‘otherwise’ clause should be read as
“limited in scope given its prior specific provisions,” as one federal judge concluded, or as a catch-all broad enough to cover Fisher’s conduct, as a divided D.C. Circuit panel held. Roberts concluded The conclusion is that the latter explanation is implausible.
“Subsection (c)(1) describes specific types of criminal conduct in specific terms,” Roberts wrote. “To ensure that the statute is not read to exclude substantially similar activities that are not mentioned, (c)(2) states that it is also unlawful to engage in a broader range of activities.
An unenumerated set of actions.
To determine the extent of the “unenumerated scope of conduct,” Roberts relied on two principles of interpretation. “classic Recognized by partners He points out that teaching a word “is given more precise content by its related adjacent words.”[s] Giving a word such a broad meaning as to be inconsistent with “the company it keeps.” similar”, a “generic or collective term” at the end of a “list of specific items” is often “controlled and defined by reference to” the “specific category…” that precedes it.
Roberts illustrates these principles with the example of a zoo sign that reads: “Do not pet, feed, yell, or throw objects at the animals, or otherwise disturb them.” Does the last phrase include “Visitors” [who] Eat lunch in front of a hungry gorilla or talk to a friend near his enclosure”? Common sense says no.
“While the smell or sound of human food is likely to disturb gorillas, specific examples of impermissible behavior all involve direct interaction with and harassment of zoo animals,” Roberts wrote. “Merely eating or talking is inconsistent with the examples provided by the zoo. It is so different that even if these activities are indeed covered by the language, it is implausible to assume that these activities are prohibited.”
Roberts does the same here: “The ‘other’ provisions of section 1512(c)(2) are also subject to the offenses listed previously. The offenses enumerated in subsection (c)(1) cover ” Altering, destroying, mutilating, or concealing a record, document, or other object…with intent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use in an official proceeding. Although subsection (c)(1) may seem complex, it contains only a few purposes. Specific examples of prohibited conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of items in a formal proceeding: altering records, altering documents, concealing This list is followed by the remaining provisions in (c)(2) so that Congress would not have trouble spelling out ( c)(List in ) is for guidance. 2) The scope is defined by reference to (c)(1).
Roberts said that if the government correctly believes that “otherwise” covers any conduct that “impedes, affects, or impedes any official proceeding,” then “full coverage of subsection (c)(2) would consume (c)(1), thereby rendering The provision is narrow and requires no work. This interpretation raises the “excess problem,” which contradicts the common assumption that every part of the statute is designed to accomplish something.
In line with the government’s theory, Roberts wrote, “Section 1512(c) includes
Fine-grained paragraph (c)(1) focuses on obstruction that impairs evidence, while general paragraph (c)(2) addresses all other obstructions. To criminalize conduct, activist Roberts noted that during oral arguments in April, Deputy Attorney General Elizabeth Prelogar acknowledged that “it is conceivable that peaceful protesters might be prosecuted under Section 1512(c)(c).” 2) and faces 20 years in prison.” He added that the government “will likewise have no apparent impediment to prosecuting under (c)(2) any lobbying activity that ‘influences’ official proceedings and is conducted ‘corruptly’.”
Roberts said these “bizarre results” highlighted the implausibility of the government’s explanations. “Rather than transforming this evidence-centered statute into a blanket obstruction of justice solution, we interpret subsection (c)(2) in the context of subsection (c)(1),” he wrote. “This would be done with due respect for the ‘prerogative of Congress’ to carry out the typical legislative act of defining crimes and setting penalties. “
In this case, the lineup didn’t exactly break down ideological lines. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, who often joins Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan in dissenting from rulings by the court’s conservative majority, agreed with Roberts. She also wrote a concurring opinion stating that “today’s case has nothing to do with the immoral conduct of the Capitol rioters.” “Our commitment to equal justice and the rule of law requires courts to faithfully apply written criminal laws, even in times of national crisis,” she said. “Despite the egregious circumstances involved in this case, or the government’s decision to prosecute them, today this court is tasked with determining what conduct is prohibited by the criminal statutes that have been invoked as grounds for the obstruction charge at issue here. in accordance with.
Meanwhile, Justice Amy Coney Barrett, who is usually aligned with the conservative majority, wrote a dissent joined by Sotomayor and Kagan, blaming Roberts and others. Ignore the plain meaning of Section 1512(c)(2). “The court did not question whether the joint session of Congress complied with ‘formal procedure’; the rioters delayed the proceedings; and even Fisher’s alleged actions, including trespassing and physical confrontation with law enforcement, were part of a successful crackdown. Stop targeting Certification of election results,” she wrote. “Given these premises, the case in which Fisher could be tried for ‘impeding, influencing or impeding an official proceeding’ appears to be open and closed.”
Barrett said the majority concluded otherwise “because they simply cannot believe that Congress meant what it said.” Statutes, she wrote, “often go further than the issues that inspired them, and the rules under which they are interpreted , we will stick to the text no matter what.” “The court abandoned this approach and reversed the text to find some way—any Method—Narrowing the scope of subsection (c)(2).
The practical impact of this decision is important for defendants like Fisher, given the severe penalties authorized by the provision. But the Justice Department can also bring (and has brought) other charges against the Capitol rioters, ranging from misdemeanors such as “entering and remaining in a restricted building” to felonies such as aggravated assault. Although the court’s ruling denied two charges against Trump, it did not affect the other two counts in the election interference indictment: conspiracy to defraud the United States and conspiracy to deprive Americans of their right to vote.
A more serious threat to prosecution is a lawsuit over whether — and, if so, to what extent — Trump is immune from criminal charges for his “official actions” as president. The Supreme Court is expected to rule on the issue on Monday. But with just four months left until the presidential election, even if the courts clear the way, any trial is likely to begin after the results are determined. If Trump wins the election, as he now seems poised to do, he will surely find a way to make this case go away.
