exist FDA v. Hippocratic Medical Alliance, the court rejected three theories of standing: (1) anticipated conscientious objection, (2) anticipated pecuniary harm, and (3) diversion of resources. However, the Fifth Circuit also raised an alternative theory of standing that the court did not address.
Judge Ho agreed to uphold the original verdict on the grounds of aesthetic harm.
In addition to the injuries analyzed by the majority, plaintiffs also demonstrated another basis for Article III status: the aesthetic harm they suffered in the course of their work. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 US 727, 734-35, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) (treating aesthetic harm as “injury to a cognizable interest”) ; Lujan v. Defs. Wildlife, 504 US 555, 562-63, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (“[T]His desire to use or observe a certain animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a recognizable interest for standing purposes. “[T]People who observe or handle certain animals threatened by the federal decision face clear harm. When it comes to items that threaten animals, see Lujan, 564, 112 S.Ct.
Unborn babies are a source of deep joy to those who see them. Expectant parents eagerly share ultrasound photos with loved ones. Friends and family cheered at the sight of their unborn child. Doctors enjoy working with unborn patients, and Aesthetic damage during miscarriage.
Plaintiffs’ statements indicate that they Experience aesthetics The harm caused by the destruction of unborn life.
In short, if naturalists can claim that seeing plants and animals causes aesthetic harm, anti-abortion doctors can claim to cause similar harm to newborn babies.
The Supreme Court recognized that “a person who observes or handles a particular animal threatened by a federal decision will face manifest harm because the subject of his interest will no longer exist.” Lujan, 504 U.S., 112 S.C. 566 2130 . Every circuit court, including our own, has concluded that when a federal agency authorizes a third party to harm animals or plants What the plaintiff intends to view or study satisfies all of the requirements for Article III eligibility. . . .
I see no reason to allow Article 3 to stand on the grounds of aesthetic harm when it comes to animals and plants – but not to unborn human life.
Aesthetic arguments are actually based on Haven Propertiesthis precedent received its last rites today.
At the time the complaint was filed, the three individual plaintiffs, all residents of the city of Richmond or neighboring Henrico County, claimed they had been harmed by the petitioners’ discriminatory conduct. Coles, a black tenant, claimed he was “denied the right to rent property in Henrico County.” Additionally, he and two tester plaintiffs claimed that Havens’ practices deprived them of “important social, professional, business and economic, political and Aesthetic benefits Interracial associations resulting from living in integrated communities free of discriminatory housing practices.
In other words, the plaintiffs claimed that racially diverse communities caused aesthetic harm. this haven The court did not dismiss the issue;
On appeal, the Supreme Court could have considered the standing “aesthetics” argument raised by Mr Justice Ho. But Judge Kavanaugh did not do that. In fact, he positively quotes some form of naturalist position:
Consistent with this understanding of how standing principles develop and consolidate, courts have identified a variety of familiar situations in which government regulation of third-party individuals or businesses could cause de facto harm to unregulated plaintiffs . For example, when the government regulates (or under-regulates) a business, the regulation (or lack of regulation) may have downstream or upstream consequences for others in the chain, such as certain manufacturers, retailers, suppliers, competitors, or customers. economic harm. . . . When the government regulates park, national forest or body of waterFor example, this provision may cause harm to individual users. For example, Summers, 555 US, p. 494.
Why didn’t the court address the aesthetic stance argument? The fauna does not bark, the plants do not bloom.
Perhaps the court said nothing because addressing aesthetic harm would undermine a unanimous decision. Or the court’s inability to meaningfully distinguish the arguments raised in Justice Ho’s concurrence from various environmental cases.
It is also possible that the court may find that the issue has been forfeited or abandoned. To my knowledge, ADF has not raised an “aesthetic” harm argument in briefs in either the district court or the Fifth Circuit. But ADF did make an argument to the Supreme Court:
If the plaintiff has an “undeniable…identifiable interest” in avoiding the suffering of losing “an animal species,” then Lujan v. Defs. Wildlife, 504 US 555, 562–63 (1992), even the opportunity to “view[ ] flora and fauna,” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 US 488, 494 (2009), then the defendant doctors had a specific interest in averting a heartbreaking emergency that would have required them to participate in the process of ending unborn life .Aesthetic damage “Destruction of unborn life” was “cognizable”). The emotional harm suffered by the respondent was “sufficient”[s] Article 3 provides.
It’s not clear to me if this question was kept below, so maybe it was confiscated. California v. Texas think even one jurisdiction If no argument is made below, it will be invalid. (Years later I’m still angry about that holding – the question used to be reserve.
If the issue is abandoned, then the court’s failure to resolve it is irrelevant. I don’t think you can say anything about an aesthetic position when you read this.
This argument seems applicable to some future cases.
